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Abstract
What measure of ination a Central Bank should respond to? This
paper characterizes the optimal targeting index in a multisectorial econ-
omy with Calvo-pricing, dened as a composition of sectorial inations
that maximizes a selected welfare criterion. This is a purely quadratic
approximation to the representative agents utility in an environment of
distorted steady state and sectorial heterogeneity of price stickiness. The
Central Bank is modeled as following a historical Taylor Rule. For most
parameter values, weights of sectorial inations are increasing functions
of the degrees of nominal rigidity and productivity volatility and decreas-
ing functions of sectorial wage markup volatilities, resembling most of the
conclusions from related literature. Bayesian estimation for the structural
model using sectorial quantum and price indexes for Personal Consump-
tion Expenditure (PCE) provides the parameter values that allow con-
structing the optimal index for the US economy. The result points out
towards a price index with similar properties than the PCE, with more
weight on services and less weight of ination from durable goods. I nd
no evidence that a core index based on the exclusion of food and energy
goods is welfare improving.
1 Introduction
In the last couple of decades, ination targeting has attracted much of academic
and practical interest in monetary policy. Since it was rstly adopted in 1990
by New Zealand, several industrial and emerging economies have chosen this
line of approach while attempting to stabilize ination. In the United States
a vivid debate has been taken place on whether the Federal Reserve should
adopt it as a strategy for monetary policy, being Ben Bernanke one of the most
enthusiastic advocators. Arguments pushing forth the implementation of this
regime stress the role of accountability and transparency in molding the private
sectors expectation while reducing uncertainty about the future paths of key
macroeconomic variables. In addition, many authors believe that, in opposi-
tion to money-growth rules, ination targeting can prevent dramatic swings in
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monetary policy that could be held partially responsible for the macroeconomic
mistakes of the past, such as the Great Depression of the 1930s and the ac-
celerating ination of the 1970s. Arguments against usually evoke the limited
exibility or discretion to adjust policy objectives in the face of unexpected
circumstances.
Among several practical aspects regarding the implementation of Ination
Targeting regimes, one has drawn particular attention: what measure of ina-
tion should the monetary authority focus on? Consumer price indexes are often
used because they provide an accurate description of the cost of living and,
therefore, a direct measure of the costs of ination. However, as pointed out
by Mankiw and Reis (2003), such price index is not necessarily the best one
to serve as a target for counter-cyclical policies. These authors propose that
central banks should use an alternative index that gives substantial weight to
the level of nominal wages. Similarly, some economists have argued that core
ination, that is, ination measure with the exclusion of certain components
of high price volatility such as food and energy goods, may provide a better
assessment of inationary welfare losses. The intuition is that, under the as-
sumption of a positive long-term trade-o¤ between ination and output growth,
focusing on prices subject to a smaller degree of nominal rigidity would imply a
higher frequency of policy interventions and, possibly, a higher volatility in real
variables. In a seminal paper, Aoki (2001) stresses that optimal policy consists
of stabilizing a sticky-price ination measure, rather than a broader measure en-
compassing exible prices. In a related two-region model, Benigno (2003) shows
that ination targeting policy in which higher weight is given to the ination in
the region with higher degree of nominal rigidity is nearly optimal.
Recent empirical research on price stickiness, such as Nakamura and Steins-
son (2008) and Bill and Klenow (2004), has underlined the fact that prices
are not only sticky, but there is a substantial amount of heterogeneity across
sectors. This conclusions call for a reassessment of previous works, under a
more realistic multi-sectorial environment. The objective of this paper is to
establish a measure of ination that a Central Bank committed to stabilizing
ination through a simple policy rule should target. This measure is dened
as a composition of sectorial inations that maximizes a selected welfare crite-
rion, which ranks policies according to Ramsey rational expectation equilibrium
with commitment. I depart from a multi-sector version of the New Keynesian
framework with Calvo (1983) pricing and derive a purely quadratic approxima-
tion to the representative consumers utility function by following Benigno and
Woodfords (2003). The behavior of the Central Bank is modeled by a simplistic
Taylor rule: interest rate is set taking into account the current level of ination,
output gap and the past level of interest rate. Although this is not a free of
controversy assumption, as stressed in Svensson (2003), I believe it provides a
simple way to characterize some of the central features of an ination target-
ing regime: absence of other nominal anchors, such as money growth target or
xed exchange-rate systems, absence of scal dominance and policy instrument
independency and, of course, institutional commitment to price stability by in-
creasing interest rate in response to deviations from some measure of ination
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to an established target.
The next Section presents the model economy. In particular, it establishes a
welfare criterion that rank suboptimal paths for endogenous variables. Section 3
denes the ideal Targeting Index (TI) and presents some of its theoretical prop-
erties. For the great range of values considered, the weight of sectorial ination
on the Targeting Index is an increasing function of the degree of nominal rigid-
ity and of the variance of productivity shocks, and a decreasing function of the
variance of sectorial wage markup shocks. In Section 4, an empirical attempt us-
ing Bayesian methodology determines the parameter values for the US economy
using quantum and price indexes for thirteen categories of consumption prod-
ucts from Personal Consumption Expenditure (PCE), obtained at the Bureau
of Economic Analysis. Sectorial ination weights on the Targeting Index are,
then, optimally established using the mean from posteriori distributions from
parameter estimations. I nd no support that the exclusion of food or energy
goods from the Targeting Index is welfare improving. In fact, optimal weights
are close to the sector weights from PCE price index, with more emphasis going
from durable goods to service goods. The last Section concludes.
2 Model
The model is a multi-sector version of the standard New Keynesian setup, de-
tailed in Woodford (2003). I depart from that framework by allowing for het-
erogeneity in price stickiness a la Calvo (1983): rms in di¤erent productive
sectors may have di¤erent probabilities of updating their nominal prices. There
is a set Z of measure one of di¤erentiated goods and respective suppliers work-
ing under monopolistic competition. These suppliers can be aggregated into a
nite number of intervals or K productive sectors. Each good as well as each
supplier is indexed by z 2 [0; 1] and k 2 [1; 2; :::;K]. We denote as mk the
measure obtained from the aggregation of all suppliers working under sector k,
which can be understood as the relative weight of sector k, since
PK
k=1mk = 1,
where 0 < mk < 1.
2.1 Agents
A representative household chooses a Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) composite of di¤eren-
tiated consumption goods and supplies labor hours to a continuum of di¤erent
types to monopolistically competitive rms (i.e., respectively, Ct and hk;t(z))
Ut  Et
1X
j=t
j t
"
u (Cj) 
KX
k=1
Z
mk
v (hk;t(z)) dz
#
; (1)
where  is the discount factor and the utility is isoelastic for simplicity,
u (Ct)  C
1 
t
1   ; (2)
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KX
k=1
Z
mk
v (hk;t(z)) dz 
KX
k=1
Z
mk

1 + 
hk;t(z)
1+dz; (3)
where ,  and  are all greater than zero and represent, respectively, the inverse
of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution of consumption, the inverse of the
Frisch elasticity of labor supply, and  is a normalizing constant.
The CES aggregate good Ct is a weighted sum of sector aggregates Ck;t:
Ct 
"
KX
k=1
m
1=
k C
( 1)=
k;t
#=( 1)
; (4)
where  > 0 is the elasticity of substitution across sectors. The sector composite
consumption good Ck;t is:
Ck;t 

m
 1=
k
Z
mk
ck;t (z)
( 1)=
dz
=( 1)
; (5)
where ck;t (z) is the quantity purchased of produced good z in sector k and  the
elasticity of substitution among goods produced within each sector. For sim-
plicity, there is no capital, investment or liquidity services provided by money.
The aggregate price index of composite consumption good produced in sector k
is dened as:
Pk;t 

m 1k
Z
mk
pk;t (z)
1 
dz
1=(1 )
(6)
and the aggregate consumer price-level is:
Pt 
"
KX
k=1
mkP
1 
k;t
#1=(1 )
: (7)
At the beginning of each period t, the representative household receives a
nominal tax-free gross interest rate Rt 1 over the nominal stock of risk free
bonds acquired in the previous period, Bt 1. The ow budget constraint faced
by the household is:
PtCt +Bt  Rt 1Bt 1 =
KX
k=1
Z
mk
Wk;t(z)hk;t(z)dz +
Z 1
0
	t(z)dz   Pt t; (8)
where 	t(z) are dividends transferred from rm z and  t are (real) lump-sum
taxes adjusted by the government in every date t.
Firms operate a constant-returns to scale technology and are subject to a
sector-specic technology factor ak;t; that is exogenously determined and inde-
pendent across sectors for simplicity1
1 It is assumed that the productivity factor has the same steady state level across sectors,
that is ak = 1; all k:
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yk;t(z) = ak;thk;t(z); (9)
where yk;t(z) denotes the quantity produced by rm z in sector k. Within the
same sector, rms are identical: they all have the same degree of market power,
they face the same productive shocks and employ the same amount of di¤er-
entiated labor hours. Across sectors, rms di¤er in terms of their productivity
and are subject to di¤erent degrees of price stickiness.
In each date, an independent monetary authority determines the nominal
interest rate Rt while the government issues new debt and adjusts taxation.
Government expenses are represented by an exogenous process Gt; taken as the
models scal shock. By hypothesis, aggregate government expenses follow the
same CES characterization of household consumption:
Gt 
"
KX
k=1
m
1=
k G
( 1)=
k;t
#=( 1)
; (10)
where Gk;t is the government consumption of sector composite good k. Govern-
ment consumption of sector composite good is dened in terms of di¤erentiated
goods produces by rms within that sector, analogous to (5), where gk;t(z) is
government consumption of good z:
Gk;t 

m
 1=
k
Z
mk
gk;t (z)
( 1)=
dz
=( 1)
: (11)
For simplicity, all government revenue come from lump sum taxes, which are
adjusted in order to ensure governments solvency. In a date t perspective, it is
given according to
Rt 1BGt 1 = B
G
t + St; (12)
where BGt denotes the end-of-period nominal liabilities of the government in
terms of the one period risk-free bond, St the government nominal primary
surplus dened in terms of sectorial aggregates according to:
St  [ t  Gt]Pt; (13)
where  t are (real) the lump sum taxes.
2.2 Competitive Equilibrium
The rst-order conditions on consumers problem imply the following demand
for good z in terms of sector aggregate and for the sector aggregate in terms of
aggregate consumption and relative price:
ck;t (z) = m
 1
k Ck;t

Pk;t
pk;t (z)

; (14)
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Ck;t = mkCt

Pt
Pk;t

: (15)
Following the denition of overall and sector consumption, governments
demand for di¤erentiated goods or sector aggregates can be derived in a similar
fashion as households demands, leading to demands analogous to (14) and (15):
gk;t (z) = m
 1
k Gk;t

Pk;t
pk;t (z)

; (16)
Gk;t = mkGt

Pt
Pk;t

: (17)
The economy is closed and all markets clear at all dates:
yk;t(z) = gk;t(z) + ck;t(z);
all t; k and z. Expressions for overall sector and di¤erenced good demands are,
then, given by:
Yk;t = mkYt

Pt
Pk;t

(18)
and
yk;t (z) = m
 1
k Yk;t

Pk;t
pk;t (z)

: (19)
From the representative consumers maximization problem, sectorial real
wages must satisfy:
k;t
hk;t(z)

C t
= wk;t(z); (20)
where k;t  1 is an ah hoc exogenous sector-specic markup factor in the labor
market, which is allowed to vary over time.2 The consumers intertemporal
problem dene an Euler equation
C t = RtEt
"
C t+1
t+1
#
; (21)
as well as a unique stochastic discount factor and the transversality condition:
t;j = 
j tEt
"
C j
C t
Pt
Pj
#
; (22)
2Benigno and Woodford (2003) introduce the same labor market disturbance in the aggre-
gate economy. An alternative approach is undertaken by Steinsson (2003), who motivate the
cost-push shock by considering the elasticity of substitution between goods stochastic. Both
approaches reach the same log-linearized system.
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lim
j!1
jEt

C j

= 0: (23)
As usual, j tk denes the probability that the price dened by rm z at
period t, pk;t (z), will remain valid until period t + j. Firm z chooses a price
pk;t (z) that maximizes the present discounted value of expected future prots:
max
fpk;t(z)g
Et
1X
j=t
j tk t;j [yk;j(z)pk;t(z)  hk;j(z)Wk;j(z)] : (24)
The term  is the stochastic discount factor, common throughout rms. Solving
the optimization problem for the rm yields the following rule for price setting
in terms of sectorial and overall aggregate variables (similarly to Benigno and
Woodford (2003) and detailed in the Appendix A):
pk;t(z)
Pk;t
=

Kk;t
Fk;t
1=(1+)
; (25)
Kk;t  
   1m
 
k Et
1X
j=t
(k)
j t
k;t
(+1)
k;j

Yk;j
ak;j
+1
; (26)
Fk;t  Et
1X
j=t
(k)
j t
C j 
 1
k;j pk;jYk;j ; (27)
where pk;t stands for the relative price of sector k , or pk;t = Pk;t=Pt and
k;j is the gross ination rate from period t to t + j in sector k, or k;j =
Pk;j=Pk;t. Kk;t is the discounted sum of (constant) markups over present and
future marginal costs and Fk;t represent the discounted sum of present and
future net revenues. In equilibrium, all prices set within the same sector at
a given date are equivalent. The relevant di¤erence from the homogeneous
stickiness case is the presence of sectorial aggregates and the sectorial relative
price level term.
Dene the measure for sectorial price dispersion k;t as
k:t  m 1k
Z
mk

pk;t(z)
Pk;t
 (1+)
dz: (28)
Given the Calvo price setting, one can show that k;t evolves according to
the following law of motion:
k:t = k
(1+)
k;t k:t 1 + (1  k)
 
1  k 1k;t
1  k
!(1+)=( 1)
; (29)
where k;t is the sectorial gross ination between periods t   1 and t. Also
from Calvo pricing, one can show that expression (25) can be rewritten in terms
of a sectorial non-linear Phillips Curve which relates sectorial ination to the
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expected discounted sum of sectorial markups over marginal costs and inversely
to the discounted sum of future net revenues.
Fk;t
Kk;t
=
 
1  k 1k;t
1  k
!(1+)=( 1)
: (30)
Iterating forward expression in (12) allow us to write the government budget
constraint as:
Wt = Et
1X
j=t
j tC j sj ; (31)
where st is the real value of (13) and Wt is dened as
Wt  C
 
t
t
Rt 1bt 1 (32)
and bt the real value of debt at date t, or bt = BGt =Pt. Financial markets clear
at all dates
BGt = Bt; (33)
and debt sustainability is subject to the transversality condition on the value of
consolidated debt
lim
T!1
Et
h
TWT
i
= 0: (34)
Finally, it is worth noting that the relative price of sector k evolves according
the di¤erence between sectorial and aggregate gross ination rates
pk;t
pk;t 1
=
k;t
t
: (35)
From the denition of aggregate price level, one can establish the following
relation between sectorial and aggregate gross ination:
1 t =
KX
k=1
mk (k;tpk;t 1)
1 
: (36)
Denition 1 A competitive equilibrium is a sequence of endogenous variables
XEnt = ft, k;t, Yt, Yk;t, Fk;t, Kk;t, Wt, Ct, Ck;t, bt, k:t, pk;tg; policy vari-
ables XPt = f t, Rtg and initial conditions X Int0 1 = fk:t0 1, pk;t0 1, Rt0 1,
bt0 1g for all k and t  t0, that satisfy (14)-(19), (21), (23), (29), (30), (31),
(34), (35), (36) and the market clearing conditions plus relevant denitions,
given the exogenous processes XExt = fGt, et; ak;t, k;tg , all k.
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2.3 Policy Rule
In order to fully specify the model, it is assumed the Central Bank is committed
to stabilize the economy by following a Taylor rule while determining Rt in each
date, such that:
Rt
R
=

Rt 1
R
R " Pt
Pt 1
 Yt
Y
y#(1 R)
exp(et); (37)
where  and  are the parameters that measure the intensity of the reaction
of interest rates to, respectively, some measure of ination and output uctua-
tion, R is the coe¢ cient of interest rate smooth, R is the steady state interest
rate (equals to  1), et is an exogenous monetary policy shock and Pt is the
aggregate targeting price index dened by
Pt 
"
KX
k=1
!kP
1 
k;t
#1=(1 )
; (38)
which can be di¤erent from (7)3 . The term !k refer to the relative weight
of sector k s price level dened in (6) over the aggregate measure Pt; to be
optimally determined by the Central Bank. The scal regime is completely
Ricardian. In each date, the government issue new debt taking as given the
choice of Rt and Gt and adjusts lump sum taxes  t according to (31) in a
way to ensure solvency of public debt. Thus, scal policy is passive in Sargent
and Wallaces (1982) sense. Such set of policy rules determine a subset of
(suboptimal) competitive equilibria.
2.4 Welfare Criterion
Any path of variables satisfying the denition of a competitive equilibrium is a
solution for the model described above. Di¤erent paths, however, can be ranked
according to some convenient welfare criterion. Consider the utility function for
the representative consumer given in (1). After some manipulation and using
the market-clearing conditions, one can rewrite the consumers utility function
as:
Ut = Et
1X
j=t
j t
"
(Yt  Gt)1 
1    

1 + 
KX
k=1
mk

Yk;t
mkak;t
1+
k:j
#
: (39)
Expression (39) can be used to categorize policies that lead to di¤erent
paths for variables characterizing any competitive equilibrium:
3 In a cashless economy, it is well known that an interest rate smooth term is clearly
suboptimal. Nontheless, many authors have considered the present shape of the Taylor rule
more conected with the empirical regularities for the behaviour of central banks throughout
the world. Adding or subtracting an interest rate smooth term does not change the results
presented. What is important is the modeling hypothesis. In other words, what kind of
equation best describes the Central Bank policy rule.
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Denition 2 In a Ramsey rational expectation equilibrium with commitment,
the social planner selects a competitive equilibrium by choosing policy instru-
ments XPt , all t, in order to maximize (39).
It is well known that, in the absence of further constraints, the solution to
the Ramsey problem above implies time-inconsistency for the optimal plan.4
One possibility for obtaining a time invariant solution follows Woodford (1999),
where the optimal solution with commitment is characterized from a timeless
perspective. This approach imposes restrictions on the problem to prevent the
social planner from internalizing the gains from private expectations on the
evolution of ination under commitment in the rst period. In other words,
consider a vector of quantities Xt = fFk;t; Kk;t; Wtg, all k and t. A restricted
Ramsey equilibrium from a timeless perspective imposes a set of preconditions
on quantities so that optimization takes place also subject to the fact that Xt0
must take certain values.5
Denition 3 In a restricted Ramsey rational expectation equilibrium with com-
mitment, the social planner uses policy instruments in order to select a com-
petitive equilibrium that maximizes (39) subject to the additional constraint of
timeless perspective Xt0 = f Fk; Kk; Wg, all k.
Hereafter, the restricted Ramsey equilibrium dened above establishes the
metric through which di¤erent choices of policy instruments can be compared.
Of particular interest are those choices of instruments based on explicit policy
rules, such as the Taylor rule used to establish the level of interest rates in the
model. The following lemma establishes the characteristics of the deterministic
steady state around which a second order approximation of the welfare criterion
is obtained. It provides the grounds for the log-approximations for the whole
set of equations considered.6
Lemma 4 There is a deterministic symmetric steady state, characterized by
zero ination rate, constant lump sum taxation and positive level of public debt.
Proof. Appendix B.
In order to express (39) purely in quadratic terms around a steady state with
positive government expenses and taxation7 I follow Benigno and Woodford
(2003). The procedure consists of deriving second-order approximations for the
whole set of restrictions and use the second order terms of such restrictions
in order to express the discounted sum of the linear term for aggregate and
sectorial outputs only in terms of quadratic endogenous variables. The following
4Stokey and Lucas (1983).
5 In particular, quantities Xt0 are chosen such as the rst order conditions for the policy
problem applied over t0 are exactly the same as those applied in any date t:
6As standard in the related literature, it is assumed that the random disturbances that
characterize the model are small enough so that shocks are unable to drive the economy away
from its approximation point to the extend that equations become miss-specied.
7Rotemberg and Woodford (1999) eliminate this term by assuming a distortive subsidy on
rmsproduction level ( < 0) nanced by lump-sum taxes.
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proposition presents a second-order approximation to the utility function in an
environment of heterogeneity of Calvo pricing:
Proposition 5 The representative consumers utility function can be approxi-
mated up to second-order by
Ut0 =  


2
Et0
1X
t=t0
t t0
"
yk
KX
k=1
mky
2
k;t +
KX
k=1
mkk;
2
k;t
#
+ T0 + tips; (40)
where the relative weights of sectorial inations and sectorial output gaps depend
on structural parameters of the economy, T0 is a set of predetermined variables
and tips stands for terms independent of policy.
Proof. Appendix C.
The loss function written only in quadratic terms of endogenous variables
resembles the usual denition for the loss function of a single-sector economy.8
However, Berriel and Sinigaglia (2008) show it presents some di¤erent features
from the standard case. In particular, policies closer to optimum should dis-
play a xed sectorial ination dispersion and strong commovements of sectorial
output gaps.
3 What to Target?
3.1 Approximated Policy Problem
As for the approximate model equations, rst-order Taylor expansion over the
sectorial supply equation yields:
k;t = k [&yt + yk;t] + Etk;t+1 + uk;t: (41)
This sectorial Phillips Curve is similar to homogeneous price stickiness case, in
the sense that contemporaneous ination depends on output gap9 and expected
future ination. These are sectorial rather than aggregate relations. Moreover,
there is an additional term that relates sectorial ination to aggregate output.
If the elasticity of substitution among di¤erent sectors is high ( 1 close to
zero), a higher aggregate output leads to higher sectorial ination. The term
uk;t is a cost-push shock, dened in terms of the models primitive shocks in
the Appendix D. The same appendix also dene the coe¢ cients in terms of the
structural parameters of the model economy.
Euler equation and market clearing condition on goods yield a standard IS
equation of the form
R^t = ~Etyt+1 + Ett+1   Etrt+1; (42)
8Appendix C presents the details of derivation as well as the denitions of relevant terms.
9Given the hypothesis of an ine¢ cient steady state, the output gap is dened as the
di¤erence between output and a target output level, dened in the Appendix D.
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where rt can be interpreted as a aggregate demand shock, dened in terms ag-
gregate government expenses, productivity and wage markup shocks (Appendix
D).
By log-linearizing the Taylor rule in (37), one gets:
R^t = RR^t 1 + (1  R)[t + yyt] + et; (43)
where et is the monetary policy shock. From (35), (36) and the denition
of sectorial relative prices, it is possible to obtain the denition for aggregate
output gap in terms of it sectorial counterparts:
yt =
KX
k=1
mkyk;t: (44)
Denitions for consumer price ination and ination targeting index are,
respectively, given by:
t =
KX
k=1
mkk;t; (45)
t =
KX
k=1
!kk;t; (46)
while both mk is the (given) relative size of sector k in the economy and !k is
the weight of ination in sector k over the targeting index, such that
0  !k  1; (47)
all k, and
KX
k=0
!k = 1: (48)
Finally, from (35) and the denition of sectorial relative prices, one gets10 :
yt   yk;t = [k;t   t] + yt 1   yk;t 1 +k;t; (49)
where k;t is a reduced form shock that depends of productivity and wage
markup shocks, dened in the Appendix D, and can be interpreted as a rel-
ative demand shock.
Denition 6 A welfare-based Targeting Index (TI) is dened by selecting rel-
ative weights !k on sectorial inations; all k; in order to maximize the welfare
criterion in (40) taking as given the economys restrictions (41)-(49), deni-
tions of reduced form shocks, uk;t, rt and k;t, all k, and stochastic processes
governing monetary policy shocks, government expenses, sectorial productivity
and wage markup shocks.
10For K   1 sectors, once the denition for aggregate output in terms of sectorial output
gaps dene the remaining sectors output level.
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3.2 Comparative statics in a two-sector economy
According to the previous Section, the Central Bank takes as given the para-
meters of the economy and selects optimally the weights of sectorial inations
over an aggregate ination index to be targeted seeking to maximize the welfare
criterion subject to the constraints of sectorial supplies, aggregate and relative
demand as well as policy rule that characterize the economy. In particular, it is
assumed the Central Bank is committed to follow a linear policy rule with all
relevant parameters are taken as given, as in the case of the Taylor rule detailed
in (43). In this Section, I depart from a simplistic symmetric two-sector economy
calibrated at usual parameter values and present numerical results for weights
of sectorial inations on the Targeting Index dened in the previous Section as
some key structural parameters of the economy are allowed to vary. I refer to
Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004) for computing the welfare under alternative
compositions of sectorial inations.
The Appendix E reports a detailed description of the values assigned to
each parameter of the model. For simplicity, there are only two sectors with
the same size and general characteristics. Under this special circumstances, it
is no surprise that !k = :5. Shocks are assumed to follow independent AR(1)
processes11 . Standard deviation of innovations and inertia parameters are set
to the same value in both sectors, for simplicity 12 . Figure 1 displays the main
results for the weight of the ination in sector A in the Targeting Index, under
the calibration considered and under the assumption that all parameters in
sector B (reference sector) are constant.
As pointed out in the rst panel in the upper left, the relative importance of
sectorial ination in the Targeting Index is an increasing function of the degree
of price stickiness in that sector under a great range of values considered. In
Calvo pricing, higher stickiness leads to higher real distortions and, therefore,
higher concerns for cyclical stabilization. This result is by no means surprising
and coincides with the conventional wisdom as pointed out by many authors,
including Mankiw and Reis (2003) in a di¤erent framework. Evidently, the
great majority of values assigned for di¤erences in price stickiness across sectors
under the calibration used lead to corner solutions, resembling Aokis (2001) and
Benignos (2001) results for a situation in which the degrees of stickiness are
not polar cases. In this sense, even if a sector has not completely exible prices,
it can have zero weight in the Targeting Index under the present calibration.
11Let e; G,ak ; and k denote the inertia coe¢ cients for, respectively, monetary shocks,
government expenses, sectorial productivity and sectorial wage markup in sector k. The
standard deviations are given by e; G,ak ; and k .
12Respectively, :2 and :5:
13
Figure 1: Weight of sectorial ination on Targeting Index as a function of
varing structural parameters
However, one of the distinct features of the analysis carried out stresses the
fact that the weight of sectorial ination over the Targeting Index implied by
the degree of nominal stickiness is not a monotone function. In other words,
for some (high) values of nominal rigidity, it is welfare improving to target
the ination in the sector with more exible prices, in the present case, the
reference sector where the probability of nominal rigidity equals .5. This fea-
ture contrasts with most results reported by the current literature. Berriel and
Sinigaglia (2008) report that under sectorial heterogeneity of price stickiness,
optimal policy prescribes a xed distribution of sectorial ination rates, which
is given by the di¤erent degrees of nominal rigidity, and a strict output gap
alignment. In other words, square deviations of aggregate ination might not
be as relevant as how sectorial ination rates commove. Hence, some aggre-
gate ination can be desirable, provided it leads to commovements of sectorial
inations close to optimal.
In the case considered, a close to one Clavo parameter implies a degree of real
distortion that approaches innity: rms respond almost exclusively through
output while prices remain unchanged. Therefore, as A increases, the degree
of real distortions in sector A increases exponentially to the point in which
such sector presents a very small ination and great output variability. As the
optimal policy requires alignment of output gaps, that implies an increasing
distance from rst best as A increases for a xed B : In the absence of secto-
rial specic instruments, the Taylor rule and the IS equation jointly determine
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the contemporary aggregate output as a sum of future expected outputs and
future aggregate inations. A recognition by the private sector of a higher re-
action of interest rates to ination or output gap by the Central Bank imply an
even smaller output gap today. Once aggregate output is determined, sectorial
outputs and inations are determined according to the structural conditions of
the model, given by sectorial demands and relative prices. But because one of
the sectors displays an increasingly higher output variability as  increases, the
other sector has to display a smaller output to conform to a xed aggregate
output.
For su¢ ciently higher degrees of nominal rigidity and su¢ ciently lower de-
grees of aversion to inationary risk (as in the case of the present calibration),
output misalignment can only be mitigated with an increasingly strong contrac-
tion of aggregate demand, which means higher real interest rates. One possible
way is to produce an stronger reaction from nominal interest rates to ination
by targeting, instead, more exible prices. In other words, by targeting sectors
that, according to the values assigned for the structural parameters, present a
smaller degree of nominal rigidity.
Another predictable result is exemplied in the second panel to the upper
right, where relative weights are presented as functions of the inertia coe¢ cient
of AR(1) monetary disturbances. The same pattern extends to other aggregate
disturbance parameters (not reported), that is: in the benchmark calibration,
aggregate shock have no inuence over the relative weight of sectorial inations.
Only sector-specic asymmetries seems to be relevant.
This last result is exemplied in the last two boxes, where relative weight
of sectorial ination in the Targeting Index is reported as a function of the pa-
rameters that characterize the AR(1) disturbances in sectorial wage markups
and productivity shocks. Weights in the Targeting Index are negative (positive)
functions of the variance of sectorial wage markup (productivity) shocks, a re-
sult that aligns with Mankiw and Reis (2003), reported in the bottom right.
It also support the conventional wisdom that central banks should target core
indexes based on the exclusion of certain product categories, such as energy
goods or food, which usually display comparably highly volatile cost structures.
Taking into account prices from such sectors imply more frequent interest rate
adjustments and, therefore, more output contractions required to stabilize in-
ation.
In addition, the weight of a particular sector in the Targeting Index is a non-
monotone function of the degree of inertia in the wage markup or productivity
shocks in that sector, as reporter in the bottom left panel. This is direct result
from the hypothesis that exogenous variables considered in the model follow
AR(1) processes. Under such circumstances, the variance of an exogenous vari-
able is a quadratic function of the inertia coe¢ cient. Therefore, the persistence
of sectorial shocks has an ambiguous e¤ect upon the relative weight of sectorial
inations in the Targeting Index.
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4 An Empirical Attempt
In this Section, I present and empirical attempt of a Targeting Index for US
economy. In the rst stage, I use Bayesian estimation to establish the values for
the parameters of the log-linearized model. In the second stage, the maximiza-
tion problem described in the last Section is carried out by using the means
from posterior distributions of relevant parameters and then determining the
optimal weights of sectorial ination on the Targeting Index.
Data set consists of sectorial price and quantum indexes for Personal Con-
sumption Expenditure (PCE), obtained at the Bureau of Economic Analysis
(BEA), which are used to construct quarterly measures for sectorial inations
and output gaps for 13 di¤erent categories of products. Series extent from the
last quarter of 1954 until the rst quarter of 2008, comprising 214 observations.
E¤ective Federal Funds Rate are also used as measure for nominal interest rate.
Sectorial measures of ination are demeaned from a common (linear) trend.
Measures for output gaps consist of percent change of per capita quantum in-
dex, also demeaned form a common linear trend. Per capita measures are ob-
tained dividing the quantum indexes by the Civilian Labor Force13 , from the
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). I employ MCMC methodology in order to
estimate the main parameters of interest14 . Sectorial productivity as well as
scal shocks are assumed to follow AR(1) processes. Wage markup shocks are
modeled as i.i.d disturbances, following Smets and Wouters (2005). Monetary
shocks are also modeled as i.i.d. disturbances, as the Taylor rule parameters
are estimated. Other aggregate parameters and steady state level variables are
calibrated at their benchmark values. Appendix F reports the prior distribu-
tions and posterior means along with 95% condence intervals for all estimated
parameters.
Of particular interest are the estimations for the degrees of nominal rigid-
ity. Table 1 presents the duration of price spells implied by the estimated
Calvo (1983) parameters15 for the PCE categories and compares this values
with results from microdata, extracted from Nakamura and Steinsson (2008)
and Bills and Klenow (2004), respectively, NS and BK16 . Categories are not
directly comparable, since both NS (2008) and BK (2004) report frequencies of
price adjustments for CPI instead of PCE groups. Nonetheless, comparisons
point out roughly similar degrees of nominal rigidity. One important exception
is Medical Care.
13Sixteen years and over.
14Four chains, with 120,000 replications, while the rst 25% are dropped. Acceptance rate
from jumping distribuion is around 20%.
15Given by  1= ln(k); times 3 for monthly durations.
16These include temporary sales.
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Table 1: Sectors of PCE and implied duration of price spells (in months)
k Categories P. Mean NS (2008) BK (2004)
1 Motor vehicles and parts 9.1 - -
2 Furniture and household equipment 6.1 4.61 3.81
3 Other durable goods 5.2 - -
4 Food 3.0 2.82 3.9
5 Clothing and shoes 2.9 2.7 3.4
6 Gasoline, fuel oil, and other energy goods 0.8 0.53 -
7 Other nondurable goods 3.9 - -
8 Housing 4.7 - -
9 Household operation 3.0 2.14 -
10 Transportation 1.6 2.7 2.5
11 Medical care 3.7 - 10.6
12 Recreation 5.0 7.9 8.8
13 Other services 2.0 - -
1 Home Furnishing.
2 Weighted average of processed and unprocessed food.
3 Vehicle Fuel.
4Utilities.
Table 2 compares the weights of PCE categories and the weights obtained
from the optimization of the welfare criterion subject to equations that charac-
terize the economy, taking all parameters as given. Optimal weights are roughly
similar to the weights of PCE sectors in the representative consumers consump-
tion bundle. Considering broader categories, there is a small increase in the
participation of Services, sponsored by a decrease in the weights from durables.
Interestingly, as observed in the previous Table, this category displays the high-
est degree of nominal rigidity among all categories, which should account for
an increase in the participation of durable goods in the Targeting Index as
seen in the previous section. The observed decrease, however, is based on the
fact that this group also displays the highest degree of wage markup volatility.
Non-durables, which encompasses, among others, food and energy goods, have
roughly the same weight. This result provides a word of caution against the use
of core ination indexes based on the exclusion of such categories of consump-
tion goods, provided information concerns and estimation accuracy of sectorial
variables are not relevant issues.
How relevant is to target the optimal index instead of the PCE price index?
In order to answer that question, I compare the welfare losses generated by mon-
etary policy conducted under the estimated Taylor rule for both price indexes.
Other parameter values are given by means from posterior distributions, as de-
tailed above. Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004) provide a detailed description
on comparing suboptimal policy rules by using a second order approximation
of the consumption equivalent of two alternative policies, as in Lucas (1987).
Using as reference the average consumption expenditure in 2006, provided by
the BLS, the welfare losses per US household per year amount for US$25,86. In
other words, each American household would be willing to forego twenty ve
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dollars of its annual consumption in order to observe a shift from the PCE to
the ideal index, whose weights in terms of sectorial ination are given by Table
2.
Table 2: Sectors weights on PCE (mk) and weights on Targeting Index (!

k)
k Categories mk (%) !k (%)
1 Motor vehicles and parts 4:91 0:00
2 Furniture and household equipment 2:52 2:80
3 Other durable goods 1:71 0:00
4 Food 18:94 23:11
5 Clothing and shoes 3:69 0:79
6 Gasoline, fuel oil, and other energy goods 4:21 4:51
7 Other nondurable goods 7:96 4:78
8 Housing 16:18 19:78
9 Household operation 5:63 2:24
10 Transportation 4:19 5:21
11 Medical care 14:37 18:95
12 Recreation 2:91 0:00
13 Other services 12:77 17:83
Durable goods 9:15 2:80
Non-durable goods 34:80 33:19
Services 56:05 64:01
5 Conclusion
This paper establishes an optimal ination measure which a Central Bank op-
erating under a historical Taylor rule should target. This measure is obtained
by weighting sectorial inations in a way to maximize the representative con-
sumers utility function subject to the set of equations that characterize the
economy. In theoretical grounds, weights of sectorial inations on the Targeting
Index as function of some key parameter values reect the results established by
the related literature. For some extreme values of Calvo parameters, however,
it is possible to show that the reported increasing relation is non-monotone, a
result credited to the use of a Taylor rule sensitive to aggregate output gap in
an environment of heterogeneity of price stickiness. In more concrete grounds,
the Targeting Index derived for the US economy using Bayesian estimation to
calibrate the values for sectorial parameters points towards two main observa-
tions. First, the optimal Targeting Index is considerably similar to ination
measured by the Personal Consumption Expenditure, with less weight given to
durable goods and more to ination in the sector of service goods. Second, there
is no evidence that a core ination index based on the exclusion of food and
energy goods is welfare improving. This result holds as long as considerations
regarding information costs from more volatile sectorial variables are left aside.
Hence, there is evidence on the importance of price stickiness, but other sector-
ial parameters as the variance and inertia of cost-push shocks are also decisive.
Durable goods received small weight in the Targeting Index in spite the fact of
18
displaying the highest degree of nominal rigidity, a fact attributable to the high
variances of wage markup in those sectors.
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6 Appendix A - The FirmsProblem
Noting that  > 1, FOC from rmsoptimization problem is given by:
Et
1X
j=t
j tk t;j
@	j (pk;t (z) ; :)
@pk;t (z)
= 0; (50)
taking derivatives and dividing resulting expression by 1  
Et
1X
j=t
j tk t;j
pk;t(z)
Pk;t+j
 
Yk;jf1 + 
1  
wk;j(z)
ak;j
Pj
Pk;j
Pk;j
pk;t(z)
g = 0;
using expression in the main text for labor supply, production function and
discount factor:
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(k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j t C
 
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
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
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1
a+1k;j
Pj
Pk;j
Pk;j
pk;t(z)
g = 0;
using expression for demand for good z in terms of sectorial aggregates and
isolating terms pk;t(z)=Pk;t.
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7 Appendix B - Steady State
There is a steady state characterized by zero ination and constant values for
all variables, where exogenous disturbances also assume constant values, that
is:  = f G; ak; k; etg, where ak = 1 and k =  > 1, all k:We focus particular
attention to a steady state with positive real debt, that is b 1 = b > 0, price
dispersion equals one, k; 1 = k = 1 and relative price also equals one, pk; 1
= pk = 1, all k. Consider the government budget constraint, which in steady
state is given by:
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(1  )b =    G: (52)
Assuming government expenses are non-zero in steady state (i.e.: G > 0),
imply, according to the hypothesis of a Ricardian regime, that  is determined
directly from (52) and proportional to both G and b: From the rmsmaximiza-
tion problem, considering k = 0; all k:
Kk = Fk:
Using denitions for both terms:

   1 m
 
k
Y k = C
 ; (53)
From (18) in the text, Yk = mk Y , which implies that
Y =


   1 sc

 1=+
; (54)
while sc is dened as
sc = C= Y ;
which is determined through the market clearing and the fact that G is positive
and exogenously given. Therefore, Y and C are dened by the equations above
in terms of the parameters of the economy.[Is this part really important???]
8 Appendix C - Approximation to Welfare Cri-
terion
8.1 Second Order Approximation of Utility Function
I start with a second order Taylor expansion of the representative consumers
welfare function where t refers to the full vector of random disturbances, as in
Benigno and Woodford (2003). Dene hereafter, for any variable Xt;
~Xt  Xt  
X
X
;
X^t  log XtX :
It is know that the following relation holds up to second order:
~Xt ' X^t + 1
2
X^2t : (55)
Given the functional form assumed in the main text for the utility function,
dene
22
u (Yt; t) 
(Yt  Gt)1 
1   :
A second order Taylor expansion yields:
u (Yt; t) = C
  Y [ ~Yt   
2
Y
C
~Y 2t + 
Y
C
~Yt ~Gt] + tips+O
3
p; (56)
where ~Gt represents the absolute deviation over GDP. Dening sC = C= Y ;
yields
u (Yt; t) = C
  Y [Y^t +
1
2
Y^ 2t (1  s 1C ) + s 1C Y^tG^t] + tips+O3p: (57)
Dene also:
v (Yk;t; t)k:t 

1 + 

Yk;t
mkak;t
1+
k:j
A second order Taylor expansion around steady state values yield
v (Yk;t; t)k:t = v
 
Yk; 

~k:t + vYk
 
Yk; 

Yk(Y^k;t +
1
2
Y^ 2k;t) + (58)
+
1
2
vYkYk
 
Yk; 

Y 2k (Y^
2
k;t) + vYk
 
Yk; 

Yk(Y^k;t) ~k:t +
+vYk
 
Yk; 

Yk(Y^k;ta^k;t) + v
 
Yk; 

~k:t(a^k;t) +
+tips+O3p:
Using the denition for k;t one can show that ~k;t is a term of second
order. In this sense, interactions between ~k;t and a^k;t or ~k;t and Y^k;t can be
ignored up to second order. Hence, expression (58) simplies to
v (Yk;t; t)k:t = 
 Yk
mk
1+
f ^k:t
1 + 
+Y^k;t+
1 + 
2
Y^ 2k;t (1+)Y^k;ta^k;tg+tips+O3p;
(59)
once one notice that ^2k;t is of higher order than O
2
p. Using a second order
Taylor expansion over the law of motion for sectorial price dispersion given by
(29) in the main text yields:
^k:t = k^k:t 1 +
1
2
k
(1  k)(1 + )(1 + )
2
k;t +O
3
p;
once one uses the relation ^k;t = k;t + (1=2)2k;t , where k;t is the percent
variation of sectorial price level k;t = logPk;t=Pk;t 1. Iterating backwards
yields
23
^k:t = 
t 1
k ^k: 1 +
1
2
k
(1  k)(1 + )(1 + )
tX
j=0
t jk 
2
k;j +O
3
p:
Here it is convenient to consider the sectorial price dispersion in the remote
past as a "term independent of policy". Further considering that it is possible
to change positions of sums over t and k on (59), and re-ordering the terms:
1X
t=0
t^k:t =
1
2
k
(1  k)(1  k)(1 + )(1 + )
1X
t=0
t2k;t + tips+O
3
p: (60)
Substituting (60) over (59) yields
v (Yk;t; t)k:t = 
 Yk;t
mk
1+
f1
2
k(1 + )
(1  k)(1  k)
2
k;t + Y^k;t+
+
1 + 
2
Y^ 2k;t   (1 + )Y^k;ta^k;tg+ tips+O3p:
Considering expressions for u (Yt; t) and v (Yk;t; t)k:t, we can approxi-
mate the representative consumer utility up to second order by the following
expression:
Ut0 = 
Et0
1X
t=t0
t t0fY^t + (1  ~)
2
Y^ 2t + ~Y^tG^t + (61)
 
KX
k=1
mk(1  )[ 
k
2k;t
2
+ Y^k;t +
1 + 
2
Y^ 2k;t +
 (1 + )Y^k;ta^k;t]g+ tips+O3p;
where

  C  Y ; (62)
k  (1  k)(1  k)
(1 + )k
; (63)
~  s 1C (64)
and
(1  )     1

1

; (65)
where feasibility constraint in (53) was used to eliminate inconvenient terms in
v (Yk;t; t)k:t. Following Benigno and Woodford (2003), we seek to eliminate
linear terms by obtaining second order approximations to all equations that
describe the economy.
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8.2 Second Order Approximation to AS Equation
The starting point is the expression for the sectorial non-linear Phillips Curve,
given by:  
1  k 1k;t
1  k
! 1+
 1
=
Fk;t
Kk;t
: (66)
We dene Vk;t as
Vk;t =
1  k 1k;t
(1  k) : (67)
Using a second order Taylor expansion on V^k;t:
V^k:t =  k(   1)
(1  k)

k;t +
1
2
(   1)
(1  k)
2
k;t

+O3p: (68)
Considering the expression for Kk;t dene k;t;s = Pk;s=Pk;t, where s  t is
some date in the future and Pk;t the aggregate price level in sector k in period
t. We use a second order Taylor expansion:
~Kk;t = (1  k)Et
1X
j=t
(k)
j t fk^k;j + 1
2
k^2k;jg+O3p; (69)
where the term k^k;t can be dened as
k^k;j = (1 + )k;t;j + (1 + )Y^k;j   (1 + )a^k;j :
Taking a second order Taylor expansion of (27) in the text:
~Fk;t = (1  k)Et
1X
j=t
(k)
j t ff^k;j + 1
2
f^2k;jg+O3p; (70)
where we dene
f^k;j =  C^j + Y^k;j + p^k;j + (   1)k;t;j :
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Using ~Fk;t, ~Kk;t, as well as V^k:t, F^k;t and K^k;t;after some algebra, we get:
1 + 
   1

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k)Et
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(k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(k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where
X^k;j   C^j + (2 + )Y^k;j + p^k;j   (1 + )a^k;j + ^k;t; (71)
f^k;j   k^k;j = zk;j   (1 + )k;t;j
and
zk;j =  C^j   Y^k;j + p^k;j + (1 + )a^k;j   ^k;t: (72)
Dene
Zk;t  Et
1X
j=t
(k)
j t f
h
X^k;j + [(   1) + (1 + )]k;t;j
i
g (73)
We can replace in the expression above and after some algebra we get:
(1 + )
(   1)(1  k) V^k;t(k;t+1) = (k;t+1)Et
1X
j=t+1
(k)
j t 1 fzk;j (1+)(k;t;j)g+O3p
(74)
We can use the denition for V^k;t and replace above, also ignoring the terms
O3p or of higher order:
   1k

k;t +
1
2
(   1)
(1  k)
2
k;t   kEtk;t+1  
1
2
(   1)
(1  k)kEt
2
k;t+1

=
zk;t +
1
2
zk;tX^k;t   (1 + ) k
(1  k)Etk;t+1+
  1
2
[(   1) + (1 + )] 
k
Et
2
k;t+1+
  1
2
(1 + ) (k)Et[k;t+1Zk;t+1]+
+
1
2
(1 + )k
(1  k) [k;tZk;t   kEt[k;t+1Zk;t+1]] +O
3
p;
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where we have dened k elsewhere:
Further simplication yields
   1k k;t  
1
2
 1k
(   1)
(1  k)
2
k;t  
1
2
(1 + )k
(1  k) k;tZk;t
= zk;t +
1
2
zk;tX^k;t    1k Etk;t+1
  1
2
 1k f
(   1)
(1  k) + (1 + )gEt
2
k;t+1
  1
2
(1 + )k
(1  k) Et[k;t+1Zk;t+1] +O
3
p:
Multiplying both sides for  k allow us to write above expression as
Vk;t =  kfzk;t + 1
2
zk;tX^k;tg+ (1 + )
2
2k;t + EtVk;t+1 +O3p; (75)
where:
Vk;t = k;t + 1
2
f (   1)
(1  k) + (1 + )g
2
k;t +
1
2
kk
(1  k) [k;tZk;t]: (76)
Log-approximation on consumption as a function of aggregate output and
government expenses yields:
C^t = s
 1
C Y^t s 1C G^t+
1
2
s 1C (1 s 1C )Y^ 2t  
1
2
s 1C (1+s
 1
C )G^
2
t+s
 2
C Y^tG^t+O
3
p: (77)
Using this result, one can be generally express (75) as
Vk;t = Et0
1X
j=t
j tf k[zk;t + 1
2
zk;tX^k;t] +
(1 + )
2
2k;tg+ tips+O3p: (78)
One could nally note that a rst order approximation to (78) yields the
known Phillips Curve of the form:
k;t = kf(~    1)Y^t + ( +  1)Y^k;t   ~G^t   (1 + )a^k;t + ^k;tg+ Etk;t+1:
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8.3 Aggregate and Sectorial Output Relation
Sectorial demand expressed is (18) can be log-linearized as
p^k;t = 
 1(Y^t   Y^k;t); (79)
which establishes an exact (inverse) relation between sector relative price and
sector relative product. It is used to eliminate references to relative prices in all
equations. Also, using (35) in the text and (79), one gets:
 1(Y^t   Y^k;t) = k;t   t +  1(Y^t 1   Y^k;t 1); (80)
all k, which is also an exact relation. Also using (35) and (79) over (36) in the
main text yields:
Y
( 1)=
t =
KX
k=1
m
1=
k Y
( 1)=
k;t ; (81)
which relates aggregate and sectorial outputs. Log linearization of (81) yields
Y^t +
1
2
(1   1)Y^ 2t =
KX
k=1
mkY^k;t +
1
2
(1   1)
KX
k=1
mkY^
2
k;t +O
3
p: (82)
whose rst order approximation in simply the denition of aggregate output in
terms of sectorial outputs:
Y^t =
KX
k=1
mkY^k;t: (83)
8.4 Matrix Notation
We start by dening
x0t =

Y^t Y^1;t ::: Y^K;t 1;t ::: K;t

(84)
and
0t =

G^t a^1;t ::: a^K;t ^k;t ::: ^K;t

: (85)
For notational convenience, we also dene the following terms:
  1 + ; (86)
!  1   1; (87)
   +  1; (88)
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~  s 1C ; (89)
&  ~    1; (90)
and
!C 
Y   C
C
; (91)
in addition to:
sC  C= Y : (92)
Using the denitions above, expression in (61) can be written in matrix notation
as
Ut0  
Et0
1X
t=t0
t t0fA0xxt  
1
2
x0tAxxxt   x0tAtg+ tips+O3p; (93)
where Ax, Axx, and A are, respectively, (2K+1) 1, (2K+1) (2K+1) and
(2K + 1) (2K + 1) matrices, such as:
A0x =

1  m1(1  ) :::  mK(1  ) 0 ::: 0

; (94)
Axx =
24 A11xx 0 00 A22xx 0
0 0 A33xx
35 ; (95)
where A11xx is a 1 1 matrix such as
A11xx =  (1  ~);
A22xx is a K K diagonal matrix such as its typical kth element is
 
A22xx

kk
= mk(1  );
A33xx is a K K diagonal matrix such as its typical kth element is
 
A33xx

kk
=
mk(1  )
k
;
and
A =
24 A11 0 00 A22 0
0 0 0
35 ; (96)
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where
A11 =  ~
and A22 is a K K diagonal matrix such as its typical kth element is
 
A22

kk
=  mk(1  );
and where we have observed the denitions in (62)-(65).
The Sectorial Phillips Curve expressed in (78) can also be written in matrix
notation. We start by substituting expressions for p^k;t into denitions for zk;t
and X^k;t, underlined in (72) and (71). Quadratic and linear terms of random
disturbances are placed into tips. After some manipulation one obtains:
Vk;t0 = Et0
1X
j=t0
j t0fC 0x;kxt +
1
2
x0tCxx;kxt + x
0
tC;ktg+ tips+O3p; (97)
for a generic sector k. As in (93), matrices Cx;k, Cxx;k, and C;k have, respec-
tively, dimension (2K + 1) 1, (2K + 1) (2K + 1) and (2K + 1) (2K + 1),
such as:
C 0x;k =

C110x;k C
120
x;k 0

; (98)
where C110x;k is 1 1 matrix such as
C110x;k = k&
every k, C120x;k is 1K matrix such as 
C120x;k

1k
= k
and zeros elsewhere; and
Cxx:k =
24 C11xx:k C12xx:k 0C21xx:k C22xx:k 0
0 0 C33xx:k
35 (99)
such that C11xx;k is 1 1 matrix
C11xx;k =  k[~!C + &2]
for every k, C12xx;k is 1K matrix such that 
C12xx;k

1k
= k&!
and zeros elsewhere, all k; and C120xx;k = C
21
xx;k; C
22
xx;k is K K diagonal matrix
such that, all k,
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 
C22xx;k

kk
= k( + !)
C33xx;k is K K diagonal matrix such that, for all k, 
C33xx;k

kk
= 
Also, matrix C;k can be dened as
C;k =
24 C11;k 0 0C21;k C22;k C23;k
0 0 0
35 (100)
where C11;k is 1 1 matrix, such that
C11;k = k[!C + ~ + !]~
for every k; C21;k is a K  1 matrix, such as 
C21;k

1k
=  k!~
and zero elsewhere, C22;k is K K diagonal matrix such that 
C22;k

kk
=  k2
and zero elsewhere, C23;k is K K diagonal matrix such that 
C23;k

kk
= k
and zero elsewhere.
Equation (82) can be expressed in matrix notation as
0 =
1X
j=t
j tfH 0xxt +
1
2
x0tHxxxtg+O3p (101)
where we have used the fact that the denition for aggregate output in terms
of its sectorial counterparts expressed in (82) is valid at all dates. Matrices Hx
and Hxx have, respectively, dimension (2K + 1) 1 and (2K + 1) (2K + 1),
such as:
H 0x =

1  m1 :::  mK 0 ::: 0

; (102)
Hxx = !
24 1 0 00 H22xx 0
0 0 0
35 ; (103)
where H22xx is a K K diagonal matrix such as 
H22xx

kk
=  mk;
for every k:
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8.5 Elimination of Linear Terms
In order to eliminate linear terms in (93), we need to nd a set a multipliers
#1C ; :::; #
K
C ; #H , such as
#1CC
10
x + :::+ #
K
CC
K0
x + #HH
0
x = A
0
x (104)
By solving the linear system of equations, one gets the following set of solu-
tion:
#H =
+ &(1  )
& + 
(105)
and, for every k;
#kC =
mk
k

& + 
(106)
where we have used the denitions in (63)-(65).
Hence, using relations (93), (97), (101) and (104) one can write:
Et0
1X
j=t0
j t0A0xxt = Et0
1X
j=t0
j t0 [
KX
k=1
#kCC
k0
x + #HH
0
x]xt (107)
=  Et0
1X
j=t0
j t0f1
2
x0tDxxxt + x
0
tDtg+
KX
k=1
#kCVk;t0 ;
where
Dxx =
KX
k=1
#kCCxx;k + #HHxx
and
D =
KX
k=1
#kCC
k
 :
We use this last relations in order to rewrite (93) as
Ut0   
Et0
1X
t=t0
t t0f1
2
x0tQxxxt + x
0
tQtg+ Tt0 + tips+O3p (108)
where
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Tt0 = 
f
KX
k=1
#kCVk;t0g (109)
is a vector of predetermined variables and where Qxx and Q can be dened,
respectively, as
Qxx =
24 Q11xx Q12xx 0Q21xx Q22xx 0
0 0 Q33xx
35 ; (110)
where Q11xx is a 1 1 matrix such as
Q11xx =  (1  ~)  [~!C + &2]

& + 
+ !
+ &(1  )
& + 
;
Q22xx is a K K diagonal matrix such as, for a generic k diagonal element, 
Q22xx

kk
= mkf(1  ) + !
& + 
[2&    &]g;
Q33xx is a K K diagonal matrix such as, for a generic k diagonal element,
 
Q33xx

kk
=
mk
k
[1  + 
& + 
];
Q12xx a 1K such as its typical kth-column element is 
Q12xx

1k
= mk&!

& + 
;
and Q21xx = Q
120
xx . In the same fashion, we dene the matrix Q as
Q =
24 Q11 0 0Q21 Q22 Q23
0 0 0
35 ; (111)
where Q11 is a 1 1 matrix such as
Q11 =  ~ + [!C + ~ + !]~

& + 
;
Q22 is a K K diagonal matrix such as, for a generic k diagonal element,
 
Q22

kk
=  mk[1  + 
& + 
];
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Q21 a K  1 dimension matrix such as its typical kth-line element is 
Q21

k1
=  mk!~ 
& + 
;
Q23 a K K diagonal matrix such as its typical kth-line element is
 
Q23

k1
= mk

& + 
:
Simplifying (108) further by getting rid-o¤ tax rates references and by sepa-
rating terms referring to sectorial and overall outputs from references to sectorial
ination. Proceeding in such fashion yields
Ut0 =  


2
Et0
1X
t=t0
t t0fx0y;t ~Qyxy;t+2x0y;t ~Qt+x0;t ~Qx;tg+Tt0 + tips+O3p;
(112)
where xy;t is a K + 1  1 vector containing only references to aggregate and
sectorial outputs measures, or
x0y;t =

Y^t Y^1;t ::: Y^K;t

;
x;t is a K  1 vector containing only sectorial ination measures, or
x0;t =

1;t ::: K;t

;
and ~Qy, ~Q and ~Q are given, respectively, by:
~Qy =

Q11xx Q
12
xx
Q21xx Q
22
xx

;
~Q =

Q33xx

;
~Q =

Q11 0 0
Q21 Q
22
 Q
23


;
where accurate specications for submatrices Qijxx and Q
ij
 are given in (110)
and (111). From (112), we now focus on the term
x0y;t ~Qyxy;t = qyY
2
t +
KX
k=1
mkqykY
2
k;t + 2
KX
k=1
mkqy;ykYtYk;t; (113)
where q terms are dened according to
qy =  (1  ~)  [~!C + &2] 
& + 
+ !
+ &(1  )
& + 
; (114)
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qyk = (1  ) +
!
& + 
[2&    &]; (115)
qy;yk = &!

& + 
: (116)
Under the assumption that wage markups is steady state as well as markups
over marginal costs are the same across sectors (k =  and k = ) , q coef-
cients are all independent of k. We use the following proposition in order to
simplify (113) further:
Proposition 7 The following expression relating sum of sectorial output vari-
ances and covariances of sectorial outputs and aggregate output is of third order:
Y^t
KX
k=1
mkY^k;t  
KX
k=1
mkY^
2
k;t = O
3
p:
Proof. On one hand, from (82)
Y^t  
KX
k=1
mkY^k;t =
(1   1)
2
(
KX
k=1
mkY^
2
k;t   Y^ 2t ) +O3p: (117)
On the other hand, from the denition of sectorial demand it is possible to
establish the following exact relation:
p^k;t = 
 1(Y^t   Y^k;t): (118)
Summing across sectors yields:
KX
k=1
mkp^k;t = 
 1(Y^t  
KX
k=1
mkY^k;t): (119)
From the denition of aggregate price level in terms of sectorial prices:
1 =
KX
k=1
mkp
1 
k;t : (120)
Log-approximation on (120) yields:
KX
k=1
mkp^k;t =
1
2
(1  )
KX
k=1
mkp^
2
k;t +O
3
p:
One can use (118) and (119) in order to replace for p^k;t, which yields:
Y^t  
KX
k=1
mkY^k;t =   (1  
 1)
2
(Y^ 2t   2Y^t
KX
k=1
mkY^k;t +
KX
k=1
mkY^
2
k;t) +O
3
p: (121)
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Comparing (117) and (121) yields the result.
Given proposition above, (113) is equivalent to:
x0y;t ~Qyxy;t = qyY
2
t + q
0
yk
KX
k=1
mkY
2
k;t +O
3
p; (122)
where:
q0yk = qyk + 2qy;yk :
We now focus on the second term of (112), containing the interactions be-
tween endogenous variables and exogenous processes:
x0y;t ~Qt = qyGY^tG^t + qykG
KX
k=1
mkYk;tG^t +
KX
k=1
mkY^k;t[qykak a^k;t + qykk ^k;t]:
(123)
where coe¢ cients dened as
qyG =  ~ + ~[!C + ~ + !] 
& + 
; (124)
qykak =  [1  +

& + 
]; (125)
qykG =  !~

& + 
; (126)
qykk =

& + 
 (127)
are all independent of sector-specic characteristics.
Proposition 8 The following expression is, at least, of second order:
Y^t  
KX
k=1
mkY^k;t = O
2
p:
Proof. Follows directly from (82).
From above, the following holds:
Proposition 9 The following expression holds:
[Y^t  
KX
k=1
mkYk;t]G^t = O
3
p:
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Proof. From proposition above plus the fact that all exogenous processes are
O1p:
From (123), one can use above to get:
x0y;t ~Qt =
KX
k=1
mkYk;t[q
0
ykG
G^t + qykak a^k;t + qykk ^k;t] +O
3
p; (128)
where
q0ykG = qyG + qykG:
We now focus our attention on (122). The following lemma can help us
simplify the expression even further.
Proposition 10 The following expression is of third order:
Y^ 2t  
KX
k=1
mkY^
2
k;t = O
3
p:
Proof. From the rst proposition:
Y^t
KX
k=1
mkY^k;t  
KX
k=1
mkY^
2
k;t = O
3
p: (129)
From the second proposition:
Y^t  
KX
k=1
mkY^k;t = O
2
p: (130)
Replacing (130) over (129) yields:
Y^ 2t  
KX
k=1
mkY^
2
k;t = O
3
p;
once we notice that Y^tO2p is O
3
p.
From (122):
x0y;t ~Qyxy;t = qy[Y
2
t  
KX
k=1
mkY
2
k;t] + [q
0
yk
+ qy]
KX
k=1
mkY
2
k;t (131)
Applying the last Proposition above:
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x0y;t ~Qyxy;t = q
00
yk
KX
k=1
mkY
2
k;t +O
3
p; (132)
where
q00yk = q
0
yk
+ qy:
Replacing (128) and (132) over (112) yields the expression for the second
order approximation for the utility function:
Ut0 =  


2
Et0
1X
t=t0
t t0fyk
KX
k=1
mky
2
k;t +
KX
k=1
mkk;
2
k;tg+ Tt0 + tips+O3p;
where
yk;t = Y^k;t   Y^ k;t
and
 Y^ k;t =  1yk [(qyG + qykG)G^t + qykak a^k;t + qykk ^k;t]; (133)
all k, and, most importantly,
yk  qyk + 2qy;yk + qy; (134)
k;  
k
[1  + 
& + 
]; (135)
while terms such as qyk , qy , and qy;yk are dened from (114) to (116) and terms
such as qyG; qykG; qykak and qykk are dened from (124) to (127).
9 Appendix D - Log-linear Model
9.1 Denition of Target Variables
Explicitly using the assumption that sector specic tax rates as well as wage
markups in steady state are the same across sectors, we can dene the target
level of aggregate output using (133):
 Y^ t =  1yk [(qyG + qykG)G^t + qykak a^t + qykk ^t]; (136)
where coe¢ cients q are dened elsewhere and a^t and ^t are respectively dened
as:
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a^t =
KX
k=1
mka^k;t (137)
and
^t =
KX
k=1
mkk;t: (138)
9.2 Aggregate supply and cost-push disturbance term
We take the rst order terms of AS equation in (78), valid for all k. Adding
and subtracting, respectively, the terms referring to overall and sectorial output
targets with the appropriate coe¢ cients yield
k;t = kf&yt + yk;tg+ Etk;t+1 + uk;t; (139)
for all k, where the denition for the cost-push uk;t is given in terms of primitive
shocks as
uk;t =  kf[(& + ) 1yk (qyG + qykG) + ~]G^t +& 1yk qykak a^t + (140)
+& 1yk qykk ^t +[
 1
yk
qykak + ]a^k;t + [
 1
yk
qykk   1]^k;tg:
9.3 Aggregate and Sectorial Output Relations
First order approximation to (82) can be redened in terms of deviation from
aggregate and sectorial output targets, yielding
yt =
KX
k=1
mkyk;t: (141)
First order approximation to aggregate ination measured by consumer
prices is:
t =
KX
k=1
mkk;t: (142)
In the same way, targeting ination measure is given by
t =
KX
k=1
!kk;t: (143)
Finally, from (80)
yt   yk;t = [k;t   t] + yt 1   yk;t 1 +k;t; (144)
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where
k;t = 
 1
yk
qykak [a^t   a^k;t] +  1yk qykk [^t   ^k;t]: (145)
9.4 Euler Equation
Taking the rst order approximation of the Euler equation in the main text
yields
R^t = ~EtY^t+1   ~EtG^t+1 + Ett+1 +O2p;
where we have used the relation in (77) to substitute for C^t in terms of Y^t and
G^t. Expressing equilibrium interest rates in terms of aggregate output gap by
using denition in (133), which yields
R^t = ~Etyt+1 + Ett+1   Etrt+1; (146)
where
rt = ~[
 1
yk
(qyG + qykG) + 1]G^t + ~
 1
yk
qykak a^t + ~
 1
yk
qykk ^t: (147)
9.5 Taylor Rule
Taking the rst order approximation of the Taylor rule yields
R^t = RR^t 1 + (1  R)[t + yyt] + et: (148)
10 Appendix E - Benchmark Calibration
The following table presents the parameter values for the benchmark calibration,
along with its denitions.
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Table 3: Benchmark Calibration
Symbol Parameter Denition Assigned Value
K Number of Sectors 2
 Coe¤. of risk aversion 1:1
 Inv. of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply :47
 Discount parameter :99
k Calvo prob. of price stickiness :5
mk Sector size 1=K
 Cross-sector elasticity of substitution 1:5
 Within-sector elasticity of substitution 11
 Desutility of sectorial labor :98
g AR(1) coe¤. of scal shock :5
e AR(1) coe¤. of monetary shock :5
k AR(1) coe¤. of wage markup shock :5
ak AR(1) coe¤. of productivity shock :5
g Standard deviation of scal shock :2
e Standard deviation of monetary shock :2
k Standard deviation of wage markup shock :2
ak Standard deviation of productivity shock :2
sC Steady state consumption over GDP 78%
 Steady state lump sum tax level over GDP 22%
G Steady state gov. expenses over GDP 19.5%
 Steady state wage markup 5%
b Steady state public debt level over GDP 50% (annual)
R Steady state interest rate level 4.05% (annual)
 Taylor rule reaction parameter to ination 1.5
y Taylor rule reaction parameter to output gap .25
R Taylor rule interest rate smooth parameter .85
For simplicity, only two sectors are considered. Shocks follow an AR(1)
dened for any variable x as:
xt+1 = xxt + "t+1;
where "t follows a Normal Distribution, with mean zero and variance 2x: Parameters
x are calibrated at .5 for reasons of symmetry. x parameters are calibrated
at .2. All other parameters have approximated values of those used in the
literature.
11 Appendix F - Bayesian Estimation
11.1 Sector Weights and Prior Distributions
Table below present the PCE sectors with respective weights. These are averages
on the sample period of 1954, last quarter, to the rst quarter of 2008. The
following table presents the prior distributions of the estimated parameters.
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Table 4: Sectors of PCE and respective weights
k Categories Weight (mk), in %.
1 Motor vehicles and parts 4:91
2 Furniture and household equipment 2:52
3 Other durable goods 1:71
4 Food 18:94
5 Clothing and shoes 3:69
6 Gasoline, fuel oil, and other energy goods 4:21
7 Other nondurable goods 7:96
8 Housing 16:18
9 Household operation 5:63
10 Transportation 4:19
11 Medical care 14:37
12 Recreation 2:91
13 Other services 12:77
Table 5: Prior Distributions
Parameter Distribution Prior Mean Prior Std.
k Uniform (0,1) .5 .28
ak Beta .5 .2
ak Inverse Gamma .01 1
k Inverse Gamma .01 1
g Beta .8 .1
g Inverse Gamma .01 1
e Inverse Gamma .01 1
R Beta .85 .1
 Gamma, truncated at 1 1.5 .1
y Gamma, truncated at 0 .25 .05
11.2 Estimation Results
This section presents the posterior distributions for the estimated parameters.
Other aggregate parameters not displayed are calibrated according to the bench-
mark values, presented in Appendix E.
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11.2.1 Degrees of Nominal Rigidity
Table 6: Posterior Distribution - Degrees of Price Stickiness
Categories Symbol Posterior Mean 95% C.I.
1 1 0.7190 [0.6966, 0.7412]
2 2 0.6129 [0.4921, 0.7158]
3 3 0.5648 [0.5201, 0.6071]
4 4 0.3626 [0.3140, 0.4127]
5 5 0.3606 [0.2992, 0.4173]
6 6 0.0291 [0.0033, 0.0525]
7 7 0.4628 [0.4097, 0.5146]
8 8 0.5306 [0.4829, 0.5793]
9 9 0.3680 [0.3089, 0.4266]
10 10 0.1547 [0.1230, 0.1846]
11 11 0.4404 [0.3754, 0.5041]
12 12 0.5528 [0.5075, 0.5986]
13 13 0.2304 [0.1592, 0.3006]
11.2.2 Productivity Shock Parameters
Table 7: Posterior Distribution - Productivity Shocks: AR(1) Coe¤s.
Categories Symbol Posterior Mean 95% C.I.
1 a1 0.0261 [0.0031, 0.0494]
2 a2 0.6394 [0.4717, 0.7777]
3 a3 0.0672 [0.0066, 0.1236]
4 a4 0.4116 [0.3364, 0.4854]
5 a5 0.1735 [0.0648, 0.2754]
6 a6 0.0206 [0.0024, 0.0384]
7 a7 0.3067 [0.1931, 0.4242]
8 a8 0.5690 [0.5175, 0.6217]
9 a9 0.0433 [0.0066, 0.0795]
10 a10 0.0202 [0.0024, 0.0376]
11 a11 0.5170 [0.4520, 0.5823]
12 a12 0.0692 [0.0093, 0.1266]
13 a13 0.1602 [0.0402, 0.2788]
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Table 8: Posterior Distribution - Productivity Shocks: Std. Deviations
Categories Symbol Posterior Mean 95% C.I.
1 a1 0.1074 [0.0979, 0.1167]
2 a2 0.0878 [0.0514, 0.1173]
3 a3 0.0395 [0.0348, 0.0439]
4 a4 0.0257 [0.0222, 0.0294]
5 a5 0.0291 [0.0244, 0.0337]
6 a6 0.0906 [0.0833, 0.0980]
7 a7 0.0241 [0.0194, 0.0288]
8 a8 0.0250 [0.0218, 0.0282]
9 a9 0.0298 [0.0269, 0.0326]
10 a10 0.0433 [0.0396, 0.0471]
11 a11 0.0345 [0.0293, 0.0393]
12 a12 0.0315 [0.0278, 0.0350]
13 a13 0.0290 [0.0245, 0.0334]
11.2.3 Wage Markup Shock Parameters
Table 9: Posterior Distribution - Wage Markup Shocks: Std. Deviations
Categories Symbol Posterior Mean 95% C.I.
1 1 0.7232 [0.6071, 0.8460]
2 2 0.3604 [0.1711, 0.5155]
3 3 0.2020 [0.1565, 0.2445]
4 4 0.0588 [0.0469, 0.0713]
5 5 0.0846 [0.0636, 0.1047]
6 6 0.0713 [0.0592, 0.0829]
7 7 0.0680 [0.0527, 0.0830]
8 8 0.0535 [0.0415, 0.0656]
9 9 0.0667 [0.0490, 0.0833]
10 10 0.0410 [0.0347, 0.0471]
11 11 0.0553 [0.0394, 0.0711]
12 12 0.1441 [0.1113, 0.1768]
13 13 0.0123 [0.0026, 0.0238]
11.2.4 Other Estimated Parameters
Table 10: Prior Distributions - Other Parameters
Parameter Denition Posterior Mean 95% C.I.
g 0.9874 [0.9828, 0.9921]
g 0.0814 [0.0609, 0.1013]
e 0.0026 [0.0024, 0.0029]
R 0.7329 [0.7000, 0.7683]
 1.5197 [1.3990, 1.6422]
y 0.5372 [0.4300, 0.6439]
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